Bank Notes

A - Accrual of action

14/3/24

DEUTSCHE BANK AG v SEBASTIAN HOLDINGS INC [2024] EWCA Civ 245

Considers the meaning of the words “arrears of interest” in s.24(2) Limitation Act 1980. Summarises principles of statutory interpretation [11] and considers the meaning of the word “due” [13] and “arrears” [18]. Considers the policy behind the Limitation Act [44]. Concludes that in s.24(2) (which applies a 6 year limitation period to recover arrears of interest on a judgment from the date on which the interest became due), “due” means payable. Time does not, therefore, start running for recovery of interest on an award of costs until the costs have been assessed so the interest is payable. The judge below had been wrong to hold that time starts running when a costs order is made.

4/10/23

SMITH v ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND PLC [2023] UKSC] 34

A claim for a remedy in relation to an unfair relationship under s.140B Consumer Credit Act 1974 can be made at any time while the credit relationship said to be unfair is continuing. In cases where the claim of unfairness relates to non-disclosure of a PPI policy commission, the applicable limitation period of 6 years does not start running when the policy premiums were paid or when the policy is terminated. In considering whether the relationship is unfair, the court must consider the history of the relationship, so until the relationship is terminated there is no applicable limitation period. If there has been a long period of inaction by the debtor, that is a relevant factor in determining whether the relationship was unfair when it ended and to the exercise of the court’s discretion to grant a remedy.

7/7/20

HOLT v HOLLEY & STEER SOLICITORS [2020]EWCA Civ 851

Considers when damage was first suffered as a result of the failure of solicitors to obtain expert property valuation evidence for the purpose of matrimonial proceedings. The court rejected a submission that damage was purely contingent until the court had given judgment in May 2012. The damage was suffered when the claimant lost the ability to adduce the relevant evidence in March 2012. That had been more than 6 years before proceedings were started against the solicitors in April 2018, so the claim was time-barred.

22/5/20

DSG RETAIL LTD v MASTERCARD INCORPORATED [2020] EWCA Civ 671

Considers the meaning of “reasonable diligence” for the purpose of the Limitation Act 1980 s 32 [27], [64]. On the facts, the question of whether or not the claimants had reason to investigate and whether they could with reasonable diligence have discovered the relevant concealment required disclosure and factual evidence to be fairly determined [70]. Also considers the meaning of “cause of action” [88].

7/2/20

SCIORTINO v BEAMONT [2019] EWHC 189 (Ch)

Allegedly negligent advice given in October 2011 had been merely confirmatory of advice given earlier in May 2011 and had not given rise to a fresh cause of action. Any claim in relation to the May 2011 advice was time-barred and the court below had therefore been right to strike out the allegation.

23/1/19

DOYLE v PRA GROUP (UK) LTD [2019] EWCA Civ 12

A cause of action for repayment following default under a credit agreement regulated by the Consumer Credit Act 1974, only arises after the time specified in the default notice for remedying the default has expired, not when the default occurs.

19/7/16

CAPE DISTRIBUTION LTD v CAPE INTERMEDIATE HOLDINGS PLC [2016] EWHC 1786 (QB)

Considers principles to be applied to determine when time starts running for Limitation Act purposes in relation to a claim on an indemnity [82] - [112]. On the facts the relevant time was not the date of the claim against the indemnified party but the date of establishment or realisation of that claim (whether by a judgment, an arbitral award or agreement).

28/2/14

CO-OPERATIVE GROUP LTD v BIRSE DEVELOPMENTS LTD [2014] EWHC 530 (TCC)

A building contractor's claims in negligence against sub-contractors were time-barred by s 2 Limitation Act 1980 because the cause of action accrued at the latest on practical completion which had occurred 12 years before the proceedings were started. Considers the principles to be applied in determining whether an attempt to assign the benefit of a contractual warranty without the contractually required consent gives rise to a trust in favour of the purported assignee. On the facts no such trust existed in favour of the claimant.

15/11/3

LEVIN v TANNENBAUM [2013] EWHC 4457 (Ch)

On the facts, summary judgment would not be given to dismiss a claim that guarantees had been executed with the applicant’s actual authority and/or under a power of attorney nor on the basis that the guarantees had been discharged by material variations without the applicant’s consent. Considers when demand is necessary to start time running to bring a claim on a guarantee [23]. Under a guarantee expressed to be payable 14 days after demand, time did not start running until the demand had been made and 14 days had expired.